Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule : a theoretical and experimental analysis
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Güth, Werner ; Levati, M. Vittoria ; Montinari, Natalia |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 34.2014, p. 206-221
|
Subject: | Bidding behavior | Procedural fairness | Voting paradox | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Experiment | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory |
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