Rating opaque borrowers : why are unsolicited ratings lower?
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bannier, Christina E. ; Behr, Patrick ; Güttler, André |
Published in: |
Review of finance : journal of the European Finance Association. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 1572-3097, ZDB-ID 2145284-2. - Vol. 14.2010, 2, p. 263-294
|
Subject: | Unternehmensanleihe | Corporate bond | Kreditwürdigkeit | Credit rating | Systematischer Fehler | Bias | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Welt | World | 1996-2006 |
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