Rational Inattention and Portfolio Selection
Costly information acquisition makes it rational for investors to obtain important economic news with only limited frequency or limited accuracy. We show that this rational inattention to important news may make investors over- or underinvest. In addition, the optimal trading strategy is "myopic" with respect to future news frequency and accuracy. We find that the optimal news frequency is nonmonotonic in news accuracy and investment horizon. Furthermore, when both news frequency and news accuracy are endogenized, an investor with a higher risk aversion or a longer investment horizon chooses less frequent but more accurate periodic news updates. Copyright 2007 by The American Finance Association.
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | HUANG, LIXIN ; LIU, HONG |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 62.2007, 4, p. 1999-2040
|
Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Rational Inattention and Portfolio Selection
Liu, Hong, (2009)
-
Rational inattention and portfolio selection
Huang, Lixin, (2007)
-
Portfolio selection with periodic news arrival
Huang, Lixin, (2004)
- More ...