Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining.

This paper deals with N-Person sequential bargaining games with complete information (perfect or almost perfect information). For N-person sequential bargaining games, uniqueness of the SPE has been obtained by allowing the players to exit with partial agreements.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Vannetelbosch, V.J.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	BARGAINING \| GAME THEORY

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	24 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669346