Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions : complete characterization
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Xiong, Siyang |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 18.2023, 1, p. 197-230
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Subject: | Implementation | rationalizability | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Rationalität | Rationality | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Vollkommene Information | Complete information |
Description of contents: |
We provide a complete answer regarding what social choice functions can be rationalizably implemented.
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