Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank clawback

Jesse M. Fried

On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed an excess-pay clawback rule to implement the provisions of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act. I explain why the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, while reducing executives' incentives to misreport, is overbroad. The economy and investors would be better served by a more narrowly targeted “smart” excess-pay clawback that focuses on fewer issuers, executives, and compensation arrangements

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Year of publication:	09/2016
Authors:	Fried, Jesse M.
Publisher:	Cambridge, MA : Harvard Law School
Subject:	Executive pay \| Dodd Frank \| clawback \| excess pay \| securities regulation \| misreporting \| recovery \| erroneously awarded compensation \| restatement \| accounting \| financial reporting \| financial results \| manipulation \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Rechnungswesen \| Accounting \| Vergütungssystem \| Compensation system \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Finanzmarktregulierung \| Financial market regulation \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Bilanzdelikt \| Accounting fraud \| Führungskräfte \| Managers