Reaching the core of the marriange market throug a non-relevation matching mechanism
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Sotomayor, Marilda |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 32.2003, 1, p. 241-251
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Subject: | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Core | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory | Ehe | Marriage |
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