Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms
In the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems, we present a bargaining mechanism for connecting all agents to the source and dividing the cost among them. The basic idea is very simple: we ask each agent the part of the cost he is willing to pay for an arc to be constructed. We prove that there exists a unique payoff allocation associated with the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this bargaining mechanism. Moreover, this payoff allocation coincides with the rule defined in Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga [Bergantiños, G., Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2007a. A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 326-352].
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Vidal-Puga, Juan |
Published in: |
European Journal of Operational Research. - Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217. - Vol. 201.2010, 3, p. 811-820
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Minimum cost spanning tree problems Implementation |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
The folk solution and Boruvka's algorithm in minimum cost spanning tree problems
Bergantiños, Gustavo, (2009)
-
Cooperative games for minimum cost spanning tree problems
Bergantiños, Gustavo, (2020)
-
Characterization of monotonic rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems
Bergantiños, Gustavo, (2012)
- More ...