Recent Decisions of the Competition Authorities Regarding Behavioral Remedies : A Comparative Study of Turkey, the EU and the US

Mergers may lead to certain competitive harms that are prohibited by virtually every merger control regime in the world. To avoid the outright prohibition of a transaction that is expected to both raise several competition concerns and create pro-competitive efficiencies, the transaction may be modified through various remedies in order to eliminate the expected competitive risks without also losing its other benefits and expected efficiencies arising from the transaction (such as improved product/service quality, greater choice for consumers and increased innovation, among others).The identification of a remedy suitable to the envisaged competitive detriments of a proposed transaction is a sensitive and complicated issue, which necessitates a detailed analysis of the transaction itself and the markets affected by the transaction. For this purpose, and depending on the particular competition risks that a transaction may lead to (such as whether they are of a vertical or horizontal nature), remedies may be imposed to modify the transaction and thereby eliminate the competition concerns.This article aims to identify and analyze the approach of the competition authorities in Turkey, the European Union and the United States with regard to behavioral remedies. We will first describe the general features, characteristics, scope and effects of behavioral remedies and clarify these issues from the perspective of the competition enforcers and judicial authorities in the above-mentioned three jurisdictions. Subsequently, we will offer information and analysis on the most recent cases in the United States, the European Union and Turkey in order to provide some guidance for a comparative assessment of these jurisdictions. Accordingly, we will offer our evaluations of the policy implementations (stemming from the relevant legislations and regulatory/judicial decisions) in these jurisdictions