Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles

A preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation if it can be derived from an arrangement of individuals and alternatives on a line, with each individual preferring the nearer of each pair of alternatives. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether a given preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation and, if so, constructs one. This result has electoral and mechanism design applications.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Knoblauch, Vicki
Published in:	Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 46.2010, 1, p. 1-5
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Spatial elections Preference representation Mechanism design

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008521745