Redistribution from a constitutional perspective
Year of publication: |
1993
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wessels, Joachim H. |
Published in: |
Constitutional political economy. - Norwell, Mass. : Springer Science + Business Media, LLC, ISSN 1043-4062, ZDB-ID 1025732-9. - Vol. 4.1993, 3, p. 425-448
|
Subject: | Umverteilung | Redistribution | Verfassungsökonomik | Constitutional economics | Theorie | Theory |
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