Regulating Quality by Regulating Quantity : A Case against Minimum Quality Standards

We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator prefers limiting the output, or capacity, of the incumbent firm rather than imposing a "Minimum Quality Standard" in order to help the entrant to provide high quality. As a by-product, our analysis makes a contribution to the study of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in a market with differentiated products

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Boccard, Nicolas ; Wauthy, Xavier Yves
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Produktqualität \| Product quality \| Standardisierung \| Standardization \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Produktdifferenzierung \| Product differentiation \| Regulierungstheorie \| Economics of regulation \| Markteintritt \| Market entry \| Regulierung \| Regulation

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