Regulation and coordination of international environmental externalities with incomplete information and costly public funds
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Mansouri, Fayçal ; Youssef, Slim Ben |
Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1468434-2. - Vol. 2.2000, 3, p. 365-388
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Subject: | Grenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastung | Transboundary pollution | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Theorie | Theory |
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