Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives : the effect of accountability
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lefebvre, Mathieu ; Vieider, Ferdinand M. |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 75.2013, 4, p. 497-517
|
Subject: | Executive compensation | Stock options | Incentives | Accountability | Risk-taking | Aktienoption | Stock option | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
-
Undermining incentives : CEO reactions to compensation rebalancing
Marsh, John S., (2018)
-
Aversion to the variability of pay and the structure of executive compensation contracts
Chaigneau, Pierre, (2015)
-
How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf, (2009)
- More ...
-
Incentive Effects on Risk Attitude in Small Probability Prospects
Lefebvre, Mathieu, (2013)
-
The Ratio Bias Phenomenon : Fact or Artifact?
Lefebvre, Mathieu, (2011)
-
The Ratio Bias Phenomenon : Fact or Artifact?
Lefebvre, Mathieu, (2009)
- More ...