Relational bonus contracts versus rank-order tournaments with envious workers

by Jenny Kragl

Year of publication:	September 2016
Authors:	Kragl, Jenny
Published in:	Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 172.2016, 3, p. 417-453
Subject:	Leistungsmotivation \| Work motivation \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Neid \| Envy \| Arbeitsvertrag \| Labour contract \| Unvollständiger Vertrag \| Incomplete contract \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Theorie \| Theory

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