Relational Incentives Theory
Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
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Authors: | Gallus, Jana ; Reiff, Joseph ; Kamenica, Emir ; Fiske, Alan Page |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Anreiz | Incentives | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (57 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Psychological Review Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 1, 2021 erstellt |
Classification: | D9 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth ; M5 - Personnel Economics ; J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; M14 - Corporate Culture; Social Responsibility ; Z1 - Cultural Economics |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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