Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts

In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Flanagan, Francis X.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 123.2014, 2, p. 113-117
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Matching \| Stability \| Consistent substitutes

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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