Renegotiation design and contract solutions to the hold-up problem
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Farès, M'hand |
Published in: |
Journal of economic surveys. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0950-0804, ZDB-ID 722946-X. - Vol. 20.2006, 5, p. 731-756
|
Subject: | Betriebliche Investitionstheorie | Corporate investment theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Theorie | Theory |
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