Renegotiation in public-private partnerships : an incentive mechanism approach
Year of publication: |
December 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Russo, Julio Cezar ; Dias, Marco Antônio Guimarães ; Rocha, André Barreira da Silva ; Oliveira, Fernando Luiz Cyrino |
Published in: |
Group decision and negotiation. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0926-2644, ZDB-ID 1155213-X. - Vol. 27.2018, 6, p. 949-979
|
Subject: | Mechanism Design Theory | Renegotiation of PPPs | Contracting | Opportunistic behavior | Revelation principle | Öffentlich-private Partnerschaft | Public-private partnership | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
-
Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
Evans, Robert, (2015)
-
Contract, renegotiation, and holdup : an optimal contract when interim renegotiation is possible
Göller, Daniel, (2019)
-
Optimal contract under asymmetric information about fairness
Pavlov, Valery, (2022)
- More ...
-
Dias, Marco Antônio Guimarães, (2015)
-
The timing of development and the optimal production scale: A real option approach to oilfield E&P
Rocha, Katia, (2015)
-
Dias, Marco Antônio Guimarães, (2015)
- More ...