Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Transfers.

We consider repeated games with transferable utility: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the comon discount factor high enough, then a trongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of Farrell and Maskin (1989) exists.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Baliga, S. ; Evans, R.
Institutions:	Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| ECONOMIC MODELS

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Series:	Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	13 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113831