Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach

We construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory policy, institutional features, economic shocks and of several characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. Copyright Springer 2006

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Guasch, J. ; Laffont, Jean-Jacques ; Straub, Stéphane
Published in:	Review of Industrial Organization. - Springer. - Vol. 29.2006, 1, p. 55-73
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Renegotiation \| Concession contracts \| Regulation

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005701886