Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a global emission game when players are impatient

von Michael Finus und Bianca Rundshagen

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Finus, Michael
Other Persons:	Rundshagen, Bianca (contributor)
Publisher:	Hagen : Fernuniv., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss.
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Verhandlungen \| Negotiations \| Klimawandel \| Climate change \| Umweltökonomik \| Environmental economics \| Internationale Umweltpolitik \| International environmental policy \| Völkerrechtlicher Vertrag \| Ökonometrisches Modell \| Umweltpolitik

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