Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Silva, Francisco |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 14.2019, 3, p. 971-1014
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Subject: | Renegotiation proof | mechanism design | verification | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE3190 [DOI] hdl:10419/217093 [Handle] |
Classification: | D8 - Information and Uncertainty |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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