Repeated auctions with budgets in ad exchanges : approximations and design
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Balseiro, Santiago R. ; Besbes, Omar ; Weintraub, Gabriel |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 61.2015, 4, p. 864-884
|
Subject: | auction design | revenue management | ad exchange | display advertising | Internet | budget constraints | dynamic games | mean field | fluid approximation | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Revenue-Management | Revenue management | Online-Marketing | Internet marketing | Auktion | Auction | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game |
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