Repeated Charitable Contributions under Incomplete Information
Incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of charities by potential donors provides an important strategic rationale for announcement of donations during fundraising drives and explains why donors may add to their initial contributions after learning about contributions made by others. In a two-stage fundraising drive where potential donors may contribute at either or both stages, it is shown that under certain conditions, announcement of contributions generates higher expected total contribution. Contribution announcement plays a similar positive role even when the charity acquires information about donor valuations prior to actual fundraising and can take actions to mitigate incomplete information among donors. Copyright 2008 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2008.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Bag, ParimalKanti ; Roy, Santanu |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 118.2008, 525, p. 60-91
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
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