REPEATED GAMES, FINITE AUTOMATA, AND COMPLEXITY.
Year of publication: |
1989
|
---|---|
Authors: | BANKS, J.S. ; SUNDARAM, R.K. |
Institutions: | University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) |
Subject: | game theory | economic equilibrium | decision making |
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