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REPEATED GAMES, FINITE AUTOMATA, AND COMPLEXITY.

Year of publication:
1989
Authors: BANKS, J.S. ; SUNDARAM, R.K.
Institutions: University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)
Subject: game theory | economic equilibrium | decision making
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Series:
RCER Working Papers.
Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Notes:
20 pages
Source:
RePEc - Research Papers in Economics
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005808140
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