Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents

Helmuts Azacis

We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents.It is assumed that the preferences of agents do not change during their lifetime.A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of the preferences of agents who are alive in that period.We show that any social choice function satisfying mild necessary conditions is repeatedly implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live sufficiently long.

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Year of publication:	December 2017
Authors:	Azacis, Helmuts
Publisher:	Cardiff, United Kingdom : Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University
Subject:	Repeated Implementation \| Subgame Perfect Implementation \| Overlapping Generations \| Necessary and Sufficient Conditions \| Overlapping generations \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice