Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents

We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents.It is assumed that the preferences of agents do not change during their lifetime.A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of the preferences of agents who are alive in that period.We show that any social choice function satisfying mild necessary conditions is repeatedly implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live sufficiently long.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Azacis, Helmuts
Publisher:	Cardiff : Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Subject:	Repeated Implementation \| Subgame Perfect Implementation \| Overlapping Generations \| Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

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Series:	Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; E2017/16
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	1025703502 [GVK] hdl:10419/230404 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012429951