Repeated moral hazard in international joint ventures : inter-temporal culturally sensitive incentive schemes for hidden action
Year of publication: |
September 2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ott, Ursula F. |
Published in: |
Research in international business and finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0275-5319, ZDB-ID 424514-3. - Vol. 35.2015, p. 166-179
|
Subject: | Contracting | Duration/termination | International joint ventures | Incentive schemes | Repeated games | Culture | Joint Venture | Joint venture | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives | Wiederholte Spiele |
-
Optimal marginal deterrence and incentives for precaution
Thomas, Lionel, (2015)
-
Collateral chains and incentives
Kahn, Charles M., (2016)
-
Incentives, status and thereafter : a critical survey
Dey, Oindrila, (2022)
- More ...
-
Termination and endgame scenarios in international joint ventures
Ott, Ursula F., (2000)
-
International joint ventures: a common agency problem
Ott, Ursula F., (2000)
-
International Business Research and Game Theory: Looking beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma
Ott, Ursula F., (2013)
- More ...