Repeated moral hazard in international joint ventures : inter-temporal culturally sensitive incentive schemes for hidden action
Ursula F. Ott
| Year of publication: |
September 2015
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| Authors: | Ott, Ursula F. |
| Published in: |
Research in international business and finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0275-5319, ZDB-ID 424514-3. - Vol. 35.2015, p. 166-179
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| Subject: | Contracting | Duration/termination | International joint ventures | Incentive schemes | Repeated games | Culture | Joint Venture | Joint venture | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Anreiz | Incentives | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.ribaf.2014.09.011 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011570033