Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms : a survey
Year of publication: |
December 2017
|
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Authors: | Peleg, Bezalel ; Holzman, Ron |
Published in: |
Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336, ZDB-ID 2527220-2. - Vol. 8.2017, 4, p. 1-17
|
Subject: | committee | simple game | constitution | effectivity function | representation | game form | social choice function | equilibrium | incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3390/g8040046 [DOI] hdl:10419/179156 [Handle] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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