Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests.
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schmidt, K.M. |
Institutions: | Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) |
Subject: | game theory | information | economic equilibrium |
-
Unrestricted Bargaining Under One-sided Asymmetric Information.
Nosal, E., (1990)
-
Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games.
Jordan, J.S., (1990)
-
Convergence to Rational Expectations in a Stationary Linear Game.
Jordan, J.S., (1990)
- More ...
-
Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe.
Schmidt, K.M., (1992)
-
Unverifiable Information, Incomplete Contracts, and Renegotiation.
Noldeke, G., (1992)
-
The interaction of explicit and implicit cortracts
Schmidt, K.M., (1995)
- More ...