Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning

This note extends Wiseman [6] to more general reputation games with exogenous learning. Using Gossner's [4] relative entropy method, we provide an explicit lower bound on all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the long-lived player. The lower bound shows that when the exogenous signals are sufficiently noisy and the long-lived player is patient, he can be assured of a payoff strictly higher than his minmax payoff.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Hu, Ju
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 153.2014, C, p. 64-73
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Reputation \| Repeated games \| Learning \| Relative entropy

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930785