Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tamada, Yasunari ; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Wiley, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1478348-4. - Vol. 20.2018, 3 (12.02.), p. 367-389
|
Publisher: |
Wiley |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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