Reputation with one-sided monitoring : ignorance as a commitment device
Daniel Monte
| Year of publication: |
July 2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Monte, Daniel |
| Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 144.2016, p. 18-21
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| Subject: | Reputation | One-sided monitoring | Commitment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Firmenimage | Corporate reputation | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.017 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011617157