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Reputations in repeated games

by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Year of publication:
2013 ; Rev., second version
Authors: Mailath, George J. ; Samuelson, Larry
Publisher: Philadelphia, Pa. : Penn Inst. for Economic Research
Subject: commitment | incomplete information | reputation bound | reputation effects | long-run relationships | reputations | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Reputation | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Entropie | Entropy | Theorie | Theory
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