Retention contracts with asymmetric information : optimistic approach vs pessimistic approach
Belkacem Athamena, Zina Houhamdi and Ghaleb A. ElRefae
| Year of publication: |
2023
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| Authors: | Athamena, Belkacem ; Houhamdi, Zina ; El Refae, Ghaleb A. |
| Published in: |
Journal of financial reporting & accounting : JFRA. - Bingley : Emerald, ISSN 2042-5856, ZDB-ID 2490369-3. - Vol. 21.2023, 1, p. 156-177
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| Subject: | Information asymmetry | Moral hazard | Principal-agent problem | Retention contracts | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Mitarbeiterbindung | Employee retention |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1108/JFRA-12-2021-0488 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014304844