Revenue Comparison of Discrete Private-Value Auctions via Weak Dominance

We employ weak dominance to analyze both first-price and second-price auctions under the discrete private-value setting. We provide a condition under which the expected revenue from second-price auction is higher than that of first-price auction. We also provide implications for large auctions, including the â€œvirtualâ€ revenue equivalence.

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Year of publication:	2014-07
Authors:	Shimoji, Makoto
Institutions:	Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York
Subject:	Discrete Private-Value Auctions \| Revenue Comparison \| Weak Dominance

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010798433