Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information
Year of publication: |
[2018]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Yamashita, Takuro |
Publisher: |
[Toulouse] : Toulouse School of Economics |
Subject: | Mechanism design | Auction | Correlated private information | Information acquisition | Revenue guarantee | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Korrelation | Correlation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Auktion | Einnahmen | Revenue | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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