Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games.

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2003) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium. We also present a method to compute preference conjecture equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Schulteis, Tim ; Perea, Andres ; Peters, Hans ; Vermeulen, Dries
Institutions:	Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), School of Business and Economics
Subject:	econometrics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Research Memorandum.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Research Memoranda Number 008
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011202008