Risk aversion and incentive compatibility with ex post information asymmetry

Martin F. Hellwig

Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Hellwig, Martin
Published in:	Differential information economies. - Berlin [u.a.] : Springer, ISBN 3-540-21424-0. - 2005, p. 341-363
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Theorie \| Theory \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Risiko \| Risk \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Finanzintermediation \| Financial intermediation \| Bank \| Kredit \| Credit \| Risikoaversion \| Risk aversion

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