Risk Aversion in Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders : A “Desensitizer” from Uncertainty

In the context of first-price auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, we show that risk aversion not only increases a player's bid, but also makes him less sensitive to the probability that other bidders are informed about his private valuation

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Munoz-Garcia, Felix
Other Persons:	Orozco-Aleman, Sandra (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Risikoaversion \| Risk aversion \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Risiko \| Risk
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 112, No. 1, 2011 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 31, 2010 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013125720