Risk Aversion in Modeling of Cap-and-Trade Mechanisms and Optimal Design of Emission Markets

According to theoretical arguments, a properly designed emission trading system should help reaching pollution reduction at low social burden. Based on the theoretical work of environmental economists, cap-and-trade systems are put into operations all over the world. However, the practice from emissions trading yields a real stress test for the underlying theory and reveals a number of its weak points. This paper aims to fill the gap between general welfare concepts underlying understanding of liberalized market and speci?c issues of real-world emission market operation. In our work, we present a novel technique to analyze emission market equilibrium in order to address diverse questions in the setting of risk-averse market players. Our contribution signi?cantly upgrades all existing models in this ?eld, which neglect risk-aversion aspects at the cost of having a wide range of singularities in their conclusions, now resolved in our approach. Furthermore, we show how the architecture of an environmental market can be optimized under the realistic assumption of risk-aversion and which approximations must be met therefore.