Risk aversion, reservation utility and bargaining power : an evolutionary algorithm approximation of incentive contracts
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Curiel, Itza ; Di Giannatale, Sonia ; Labrador-Badía, Giselle |
Published in: |
Computational economics. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1572-9974, ZDB-ID 1477445-8. - Vol. 63.2024, 2, p. 477-511
|
Subject: | Evolutionary algorithms | Moral hazard | Optimization | Moral Hazard | Evolutionärer Algorithmus | Evolutionary algorithm | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Verhandlungsmacht | Bargaining power | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Evolutionsökonomik | Evolutionary economics | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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