Robust bidding in first-price auctions : how to bid without knowing what others are doing
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Kasberger, Bernhard ; Schlag, Karl H. |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 70.2024, 7, p. 4219-4235
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Subject: | empirical loss | first-price auction | minimax loss | nonequilibrium model | robust decision making | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Experiment | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Verlust | Loss | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion |
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