Robust stochastic stability

Carlos Ferrer-Alós and Nick Netzer

A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.

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Year of publication:	2014 ; Revised version, January 2014
Authors:	Ferrer-Alós, Carlos ; Netzer, Nick
Publisher:	[Zurich : Univ., Dep. of Economics]
Subject:	learning in games \| stochastic stability, \| radius-coradius theorems \| logit-response dynamics \| mutations \| imitation \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Stochastisches Spiel \| Stochastic game \| Stochastischer Prozess \| Stochastic process \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game