Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Kunimoto, Takashi |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 108.2020, p. 62-73
|
Subject: | Complete information | First-order belief | Incentive compatibility | Measurability | Rationalizable strategies | Robust virtual implementation | Vollkommene Information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
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