Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Ünver, M. Utku
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 22.2004, 3, p. 515-538
Publisher:	Springer

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596407