Satisficing in strategic environments : a theoretical approach and experimental evidence

Werner Güth; M. Vittoria Levati; Matteo Ploner

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach. -- Strategic interaction ; satisficing behavior ; bounded rationality

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Year of publication:	2008
Other Persons:	Güth, Werner (contributor) ; Levati, M. Vittoria (contributor) ; Ploner, Matteo (contributor)
Publisher:	Jena : Univ. [u.a.]
Subject:	Begrenzte Rationalität \| Bounded rationality \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Experiment