Satisficing in strategic environments:a theoretical approach and experimental evidence

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games.Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the conceptof satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includesit as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic gamesillustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.

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Year of publication:	2008-10-01
Authors:	Güth, Werner ; Levati, M. Vittoria ; Ploner, Matteo
Institutions:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion
Subject:	Entscheidungstheorie \| decision theory \| Eingeschränkte Rationalität \| Interaktion \| Spielstrategie \| game strategy

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Extent:	417792 bytes 22 p. application/pdf
Series:	Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik - Papaers on Strategic Interaction Jena Economic Research Papers ; 078 (2008)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
ISSN:	1864-7057
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Forecast, decision making ; Simulation methods ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification
Source:	USB Cologne (business full texts)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866442