Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function
This paper presents a more general independent private value model based on the assumption that Cobb-Douglas utility function is used to make a tradeoff between the probability of winning the unit and the profit under the first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions. The equilibrium bidding strategies are given and the seller's expected revenue comparisons are made.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Liu, Shulin ; Wang, Mingxi |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 107.2010, 1, p. 1-3
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | First-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions Bidding strategy Expected revenue Cobb-Douglas utility function |
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